SHERLYN MAE F. HERNANDEZ
Assistant Professor
Department of International Studies
De La Salle University – Manila, Philippines

After years of Russian military buildup along the borders it shares with Ukraine and occupying Crimea in 2014, Russia decided to escalate the conflict when it invaded Ukraine on 24 February 2022. Since then, thousands of civilians have died and millions of refugees forcefully migrated towards the borders of the European Union. Aside from that, the economic consequences of the conflict cannot be avoided, with oil and gas prices drastically increasing and food import/export and logistics operations being highly affected. Such aggression by a powerful state is not unique to Russia and the Eastern European region. Almost all parts of the world are being affected by any move by a powerful state from time to time. Inevitably, the Indo-Pacific region is not immune to such an aggression by a powerful state, whether it’s the United States or China, or even India. It begs the question, “Do the rise of the regional powers in different parts of the world produce the same outcomes?” Does it affect its spheres of influence the same way?

THE ‘UNPEACEFUL RISE’ OF REGIONAL POWERS

On the ‘unpeaceful rise of China’, American Political Scientist John Mearsheimer said, “International politics is a nasty and dangerous business, and no amount of goodwill can ameliorate the intense security competition that sets when an aspiring hegemon appears in Eurasia”. While he was completely referring to China, we can’t avoid thinking that the same exact quote, written in 2006, will be exactly applicable to describe and make sense of Russia’s actions when it decided to invade Ukraine in 2022. In addition, Mearsheimer attributes Russia’s recent military aggression to the West and NATO, something that we should have foreseen as early as early 2000s when NATO intended on expanding its membership eastwards towards Central Europe. The same behavior by China has been observed in the Asia-Pacific region, given its Chinese debt trap diplomacy and the West Philippine Sea territorial disputes and China’s continuous military buildup on the disputed islands.

Time and again, political realism, a classic framework in International Relations, has pointed out that the anarchic state of the world has forced states to be self-reliant, and therefore, the way to self-preservation is to accumulate power. Given that, states like Russia and China who are both intending to accumulate and project power in different circumstances, provoked instability within their own spheres of influence. Can both the Russian Invasion of Ukraine and the West Philippine Sea Territorial Disputes provide us patterns about the ‘unpeaceful rise’ of regional powers?

SOUNDS FAMILIAR: PARALLELS WITH THE WEST PHILIPPINE SEA TERRITORIAL DISPUTES

Given Russia’s traditional projection of power over the Eastern European region and the post-Soviet states, it is safe to assume that it is trying to assume the role of a regional power in the Eurasian world. The shift from a bipolar to a multipolar world after the Cold War has paved the way for different regional powers. Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and eventually the 2022 Russian Invasion of Ukraine are clear proofs that the power-seeking behaviors of states contribute to an inevitable propensity of conflict in the international community.

Moving closer to home, despite the absence of an armed conflict, we can very well observe that a regional power has existed since the rise of China. In this case, China actually wanted to become more of a global superpower than a mere regional power in the Indo-Pacific region given its aggressive moves that continue to trigger the United States. In the past few years, China has consistently challenged the peace and stability in the region by projecting offensive moves towards the small states in the region, including the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations or ASEAN, through the West Philippine Sea Disputes.

Both Russia and China undoubtedly leverage their stronger political, economic, and military power to fulfill their objectives at the expense of the territories within their spheres of influence. Therefore, we can observe patterns as to the nature of both conflicts, as well as their possible remedies or solutions:

• Both conflicts are more than just sub-regional in scope. The Russian Invasion of Ukraine is more than a conflict between two parties (Russia and Ukraine), and the West Philippine Sea conflict is more than just a conflict between China and the other claimant states. Concepts such as complex interdependence and globalization tells us that whatever is happening in one part of the world can basically drag everyone else to it because we are more connected than we think. Moreover, each party to both conflicts have pre-existing political, military, cultural, and economic alliances with certain state and non-state actors, the latter having the tendency to become secondary or indirect parties to these conflicts. Hence, both conflicts are considered international in scope.
• The origins of both the 2022 Russian Invasion of Ukraine and the West Philippine Sea Territorial Disputes cannot only be traced back to the recent past, but even beyond that. The ongoing conflicts are just tips of the icebergs, and below them are several other ideological, political, historical, and cultural issues that the parties also need to deal with.
• Given the international nature of both conflicts, its resolution, therefore, does not only require the direct parties involved. Both conflicts require more parties, including non-state actors or institutions than it should, to possibly come up with solutions to the issue. I can’t remember any other conflicts in the past that were “resolved” without the participation of a third, fourth, fifth, or several indirect parties. Large-scale conflicts like these require a mediator state or an independent non-state actor.

GREAT POWERS AND IMPLICATIONS ON DEMOCRACY AND SOVEREIGNTY

In the Post-Cold War or New World Order, the ‘triumph of the liberal state’, as coined by Francis Fukuyama, has considered democracy and state sovereignty as two of the ‘most sacred values’ in the contemporary inter-state system. Every state and non-state actor in the international community is expected to respect them, and some conflicts arise due to forcing or coercing states to loosen or completely give up their sovereignty against their will, which can eventually challenge the idea and practice of democracy in their respective territories.

Both national sovereignty and democracy are important themes touched both by the Russian Invasion of Ukraine, and the West Philippine Sea Disputes. On one hand, both conflicts are indeed attacks to the sovereignty of Ukraine and the other claimants in the West Philippine Sea, respectively. On the other hand, democracy, being more of an internal political principle, can possibly be at stake once Ukraine and the West Philippine Sea state claimants lose their internal sovereignty over their lands as a consequence of Russia’s and China’s actions.

It is to be noted, however, that the principles of sovereignty and democracy do not always go hand in hand. In theory, sovereign states have the right to be a non-democratic state. Russia had abandoned the totalitarian system when Mikhail Gorbachev started to embrace the Western political and economic model through glasnost and perestroika right before the fall of the Soviet Union. However, President Vladimir Putin has created a kind of democracy in Russia where power is concentrated on him and a few people, including the oligarchs, instead of the people. Similarly, despite China having adopted a Western free market economic model, it remains to be a classic one-party socialist system politically.

Is it therefore safe to say that non-democracies are threats to state sovereignty and order in the international system? The proponents of the so-called ‘democratic peace theory’ such as the famous philosopher Immanuel Kant will definitely agree, but there is more to a conflict than a state’s regime or system of government, despite the principle being straightforward. Democracy definitely has limitations in some circumstances, but looking at both the cases of the 2022 Russian Invasion of Ukraine and the West Philippine Sea Territorial Disputes, it is more than the structures, but of the agents as well.

OPPORTUNITIES FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: ASEAN AND THE INDO-PACIFIC FRAMEWORK

As a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and part of the Indo-Pacific region, can the Philippines be affected and/or aid in the resolution of the 2022 Russian Invasion of Ukraine? Yes and no.

Although highly arguable, ASEAN keeps a track record of keeping the peace and stability in the Southeast Asian region since its establishment in 1967 and was being credited to preventing the spread of communism in the region during the Cold War, a phenomenon predicted by President Dwight Eisenhower through his so-called ‘domino effect/theory’. Numerous agreements have succeeded and failed in ASEAN over the years, and most recently, the organization came up with the ‘ASEAN Indo-Pacific Framework’. The agreement reiterates the crucial role that the Southeast Asian region portrays in responding to the continuing geopolitical and power shifts in the international level.

The Indo-Pacific Framework can be a promising document in terms of “rejuvenating” the partnership and cooperation mechanisms of the region, but it can only do so much as to how it can possibly contribute to the resolution of the Russian Invasion on Ukraine. Aside from the long list of criticisms on every attempt by ASEAN to foster political and security cooperation not only in Southeast Asia but in the greater Indo-Pacific region, the fine print of the framework only intends to reaffirm most of what has been initiated in the past, which are more inclined towards economic cooperation and development. Have you ever wondered why the economic relations of the Philippines and China, for instance, were barely affected despite the long-standing territorial disputes between us? It’s because the region, being used to the rise of China, has started getting used to it and has already been managing its relationships with China, and the Framework needs to put more claws and teeth on the political security aspect. ASEAN does not need any new grand declaration to be signed, but a mere revisit and expansion of the provisions of the ASEAN Political Security Community (APSC) can already make a huge difference.

The region can therefore protect its economic interests despite the economic effects of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine through the framework. That being said, if there’s anything that the European region can learn from the Indo-Pacific Framework, it is to leverage economic and developmental cooperation to deal with political and security issues. But who are we to suggest our best practices to a very powerful region like Europe, given our own shortcomings?

ASEAN’S ‘MESSY BACKYARD’ AS AN IMPEDIMENT TO COOPERATE

The classic saying “You cannot pour from an empty cup” and the phrase “clean up your own backyard first” are highly applicable to ASEAN’s current overall situation, as well as its capacity to contribute to the resolution of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine.

First, given the region’s own limitations in resolving our own conflicts in our own backyard (as evidenced by failures, such as the ASEAN Integration non-fulfillment, the failure to reach consensus on issues such as on the negotiations over the West Philippine Sea Territorial Disputes and the entry of Timor Leste to the organization), ASEAN is not entitled to any right in suggesting what Europe or the world should do regarding the Russian Invasion of Ukraine. Second, the Southeast Asian region is too distant (both in terms of geography and in terms of our levels of relationships with Russia and/or Ukraine) to be able to contribute something to the resolution of the conflict. Most of the states in the region have basic and superficial political relations with Russia and/or Ukraine, and none of the states in this region can provide huge military and developmental aid to Ukraine. Lastly, as Professor Herman Kraft has said, if there’s one thing that we should be more concerned about, it is the existing strong alliance between China and Russia, which can possibly manifest in China’s action towards the region.

CONCLUSION: ‘THE TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POLITICS’ AND THE FUTURE OF REGIONAL POWERS

American Political Scientist John Mearsheimer described the Great Power Politics as ‘tragic’, meaning, the desire of the Great Powers to accumulate power and exert influence over their spheres of influence can never be peaceful. Any move by any state, big or small, intended as a power-seeking strategy will always have an inevitable propensity for conflict. This is completely true in the case of states who are vying to be the world’s superpower, such as the United States as a status quo state, and China as a revisionist state, because for these Great Powers, there can only be one global superpower. Multipolarity has paved the way for the so-called ‘Regional Powers’, and it somehow helped tame these Great Powers by agreeing to dominate over their spheres of influence, or in other words, providing them their own piece of the pie.

Both the 2022 Russian Invasion of Ukraine and the West Philippine Sea Disputes has made us realize that an aggression by a powerful state in the form of a traditional armed conflict is not yet obsolete. The emergence of non-traditional security issues and its emphasized impact comparable to the traditional security issues did not lessen the utilization of military power both by Russia and China.